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STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN COMPETING 
POLICIES: THE ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO ENFORCE STATE CLEAN-UP 
ORDERS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 
Joseph P. Cistulli* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the spirit of a fresh start, filing for bankruptcy allows a debtor 
to avoid many claims. 1 Creditors, therefore, can expect little or no 
return on their investments. 2 If an estate has any unencumbered 
funds, the Bankruptcy Code ("the Code") will determine in which 
order they will be distributed.3 At the top of this hierarchy in section 
507 of the Code is the administrative claim. 4 Section 503(b)(1)(A) 
defines the administrative claim as any claim which is an actual and 
necessary cost or expense needed to preserve the estate. 5 
A review of the history of the administrative claim reveals its 
broadening use by courts as means of enforcing certain judgments. 
Section 503(b)(1)(A) provides a statutory basis for elevating general, 
* Solicitations Editor, 1988-89, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
1 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). An order for relief in bankruptcy proceedings 
discharges the debts of an individual debtor. Note, State "Superlien Statutes:" An Attempt 
to Resolve the Conflict between the Bankruptcy Code and Environmental Law, 59 TEMPLE 
L.Q. 981, 981-82 n.ll (1986) [hereinafter Note, Superlien Statute]. The phrase "fresh start" 
derives from the language in Williams v. United States Fidelity Ins. Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 
554-55 (1945) (The bankruptcy code allows a debtor to "start afresh free from the obligations 
and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."). 
2 J. ROGERS, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL LAW, BOOK 1129 (1986) (available in 
Boston College Law School Library). 
311 U.S.C. § 507 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (listing priorities of expenses and claims). 
4 [d. § 503(b)(1)(A). 
5 [d. 
581 
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unsecured claims to the level of an administrative claim. 6 Many times 
courts, citing the administrative claim provision, actually base their 
decisions to elevate claims on policy considerations. 7 Prioritizing 
claims based on policy considerations is nowhere more evident than 
in the area of toxic waste clean-up orders. Courts frequently cite 
the "actual and necessary" language of section 503(b)(1)(A) but in 
reality they go beyond the plain meaning of the statute to allow 
administrative claim status for hazardous waste clean-up orders.8 
Because a petition for administrative claim status involves a hear-
ing, the bankruptcy court can fairly adjudicate individual claims. 9 
Recent Supreme Court decisions indicate a willingness to accept the 
administrative claim argument as long as the claim is not a money 
judgment under Chapter 11. lO The reasoning and dicta of these cases, 
Ohio v.Kovacs ll and Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection,12 provide a broad reading of 
section 503(b)(1)(A). Heightened public awareness of the health haz-
ards posed by toxic waste disposal helps tip the balance in favor of 
allowing a 503(b)(1)(a) claim notwithstanding the fresh start policy. 
After reviewing the history of the administrative claim in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, this Comment traces the development of the 
administrative claim as a tool to enforce environmental claims 
against bankrupt estates. This Comment next examines how courts 
balance the imperative of the Code to provide a fresh start for 
bankrupt estates against the imminent harm posed by untreated 
hazardous waste sites. This Comment then describes various states' 
reactions to the Supreme Court decisions in Ohio v. Kovacs and 
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection. The Comment ultimately proposes that the ad-
ministrative claim is an effective means of striking a balance between 
the competing policies of the Code and the state's interest in cleaning 
up hazardous wastes. 
6 See id. 
7 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection (NJDEP), 106 S. Ct. 
755, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986). 
8 See In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) ("after notice and a hearing, there shall be allowed admin-
istrative expenses"(emphasis added». 
10 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986). 
11 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
12 106 S. Ct. 755. 
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II. ADMINSTRATIVE CLAIM STATUS UNDER SECTION 503(b)(1)(A) 
OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
A. An Overview of How Bankruptcy Affects a State Clean-Up 
Order 
When a corporation files for bankruptcy under Chapter 713 or 
Chapter 1114 creditors can expect little or no return on their invest-
ments. 15 Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings may leave the debt-
or's business intact but inherent in reorganization is a restructuring 
of debt that leaves creditors only partially satisfied. 16 Section 507 of 
the Bankruptcy Code establishes a hierarchyY Under a Chapter 7 
liquidation proceeding, the trustee satisfies secured creditors,18 pays 
administrative expenses,19 and distributes the remaining pennies to 
general creditors. 2o Creditors cannot change the priority scheme but 
if creditors can improve their position in the scheme they can gen-
erally expect a better return on their investments. 21 
The priority list of the Code provides for an orderly distribution 
of assets to satisfy most claims. 22 Non-monetary claims, such as 
government orders, however, complicate the orderly disbursement 
of funds to creditors.23 As concern for a clean environment grows, 
bankruptcy courts are seeing a greater number of state environ-
mental clean-up orders designed to ensure the cleanup of a bank-
rupt's real property.24 A state's authority to initiate a cleanup or 
receive compensation for a completed cleanup is unclear. 
When a company is solvent, a state agency, under the provisions 
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
13 11 U.S.C. §§ 701, 702 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
14 11 U.S.C. § 521 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
15 R. HENSEN, SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 2-3 (1979). 
16 See J. MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 311, at 375 (1956). 
17 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
18 11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 507. 
19 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
20 11 U.S.C. §§ 725, 507. 
21 See MACLACHLAN, supra note 16, § 150, at 145; see, e.g., 3 L. KING, K. KLEE & R. 
LEVIN, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 507.02 (15th ed. 1985) [hereinafter COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY]. 
22 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
23 See ge'neraUy Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
24 See, e.g., In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987); In re Pierce Coal & Constr., 
65 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986); In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 
(CRR) 762 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987). 
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Liability Act ("CERCLA")25 or similar statutes,26 can initiate a 
cleanup.27 A state may either order a cleanup or begin the process 
itself.28 If a state begins a cleanup, the state will be indemnified by 
the violating company.29 Bankruptcy upsets this scheme. Under 11 
U.S.C. § 554 the estate can attempt to abandon the hazardous waste 
as a liability.30 Moreover, in the spirit of a fresh start, the bankruptcy 
court delegates the state's claim to general, unsecured status. 31 If 
the state wants the area cleaned up it must pay for it. 32 The cost of 
cleanup, however, impedes the execution of the order.33 In either 
case the public suffers both fiscally and physically: the cleanup de-
pletes state funds, and the neglect of the hazard threatens to cause 
permanent damage to property and life. 
Government clean-up orders illustrate the tension between the 
Code's policy of protecting the rights of creditors and a general 
national policy of protecting the environment. 34 In the 1980's, envi-
ronmental forces in the states have sought to supersede the Code's 
priority list. 35 To prevent evasion of state clean-up orders through 
bankruptcy, the states have begun to implement "super-lien" stat-
utes. 36 
Apart from state legislative efforts, the government, as a party 
to a bankruptcy proceeding, has sought to enhance its position by 
elevating its order to administrative claim status. 37 
25 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensations and Liability Act of 1980 (CER-
CLA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
26 Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
27 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
28 See id. 
29 Fox & Gallagher, Hazardous Waste Management: Legal Implications of Cleaning Up 
Inactive Sites, in HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT FOR THE 80'S 441, 444-45 (T. SWEENEY 
ET. AL. eds. 1982). 
30 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1982). 
31 In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 762, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
32 See Note, Superlien Statute, supra note 1, at 982. 
33 See id. at 982 n.9. "The cost of compliance with environmental statutes and cleanup [sic] 
orders is enormous. To illustrate the expense of cleanup, commentators have pointed out that 
the EPA spends an average of approximately $12 million per Superfund site." Id.; see e.g., 
Moorman, Drabkin & Kirsh, Bankruptcy and the Cleanup of Hazardous Waste: Caveat 
Creditor, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,168, 10,169 & n.8 (1985) (citing 49 Fed. Reg. 
40,320, 40,325 (1984)). 
34 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, 760, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 
(1986). 
35 See Note, Superlien Statute, supra note 1, at 1005-06. 
36 See Zarin, State Recovery of Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs and Bankruptcy: The 
Constitutionality of Retroactive State Super Priority Lien Statutes, 90 COM. L.J. 346 (1985). 
For examples of "superlien" statutes see MASS. GEN. L. ch 21E, § 1 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 147-B:I0 (Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 f(f)(West 1982 & Supp. 1988) 
37 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
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B. Section 503(b)(1)(A) 
Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code dictates the system of prior-
ities under which claims against a bankrupt estate must be dis-
charged.38 If it were possible to discharge every claim of general 
creditors, while satisfying the costs of administration, trustees would 
not need a system of priorities. 39 Because it is usually impossible to 
satisfy all claims, the priorities assure payment of certain claims 
before others are satisfied. 
Despite these priorities, courts nonetheless make policy consid-
erations about the priority of creditors by applying equitable prin-
ciples such as good faith, fairness to creditors and danger to the 
public.40 Moreover, courts have looked to policy considerations to 
include or exclude certain expenses within the top priority category 
of administrative expenses.41 Because administrative expenses have 
priority over unsecured claims, the determination of what consti-
tutes an administrative claim will decide whether the creditor re-
ceives full payment, partial payment, or no payment. 42 
As early as the Act of 1800, Congress has recognized the first 
priority status of administrative claims.43 Historically, bankruptcy 
legislation has recognized the sovereign'S priority claim to a bank-
rupt's estate. 44 Although the Act of 1841 did not specify a priority 
for administrative claims,45 claimants could achieve priority status 
through a court order. 46 The Act of 1867 set up a more complete 
framework including five priority levels with administrative claims 
being first.47 Following this theme of priority, the Act of 1898, which 
38 Note, The Administrative Expense Priority in Bankruptcy-A Survey, 36 DRAKE L. 
REV. 135 (1987). 
39 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 21, § 507.02 (15th ed. 1985). 
40 [d. 
41 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). "The following expenses and claims 
have priority in the following order: (1) First, administrative expenses allowed under § 503(b) 
of this title [11 U.S.C. § 503(b)] .... " [d. 
42 See Note, supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
43 Pearlstein, Bankruptcy Administrative Claimants-Beware!, 90 COM. L.J. 632 (1985). 
"The Act of 1800 provided that debts owed to the United States would receive priority in 
distribution and in effect granted priority for reimbursement of expenses incurred in the 
administration of the bankrupt estate. " [d. 
44 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 21, §§ 507.01, 507.02. 
45 [d. "Three classes of priority were created by the Act of 1841: (1) debts due the United 
States, (2) debts due sureties for moneys actually paid out in behalf of the bankrupt, and (3) 
debts up to a maximum of twenty-five dollars for labor performed within six months of the 
bankruptcy." [d. 
46 [d. 
47 See Note, supra note 38, at 136; see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 21, 
§ 507.01. The five classes of priority were: "(1) expenses of administration, (2) debts and taxes 
due the United States, (3) debts and taxes due the states, (4) wages due an operative, clerk, 
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remained in effect until October 1, 1979, provided for the priority of 
administrative expenses. 48 After a rearranging of priorities in the 
Acts of 1926 and 1938, an amendment in the Act of 1952 established 
administrative expenses as preferred. 49 
Section 503(b)(1)(A) of the current Bankruptcy Code lists the ex-
penses allowable as administrative priorities. 50 Generally, the expen-
ses are those that are actual and necessary to preserve the estate. 
They include wages, salaries, and commissions for services rendered 
after the commencement of the proceedings. 51 In the environmental 
area, the government is attempting to secure administrative expense 
priority by demonstrating that the cleanup of hazardous waste is a 
necessary expense to preserve the estate. 52 There. is latitude for 
determining what constitutes an administrative claim. The Code 
allows courts to view pre-Code cases as relevant in interpreting the 
"administrative nature of a claim."53 
Throughout the Code's development the administrative claim has 
remained a top priority in bankruptcy proceedings. By filing for 
administrative expense status, the states or private parties seeking 
to enforce environmental clean-up orders draw on the power of 
statutory history to enforce administrative claimants' rights. Since 
the inception of modern bankruptcy law two centuries ago, Congress 
has recognized the importance of the administrative expense as an 
inducement for third parties such as dealers and suppliers to deal 
with the bankrupt estate. 54 
or house servant up to fifty dollars for labor performed within six months of bankruptcy, and 
(5) debts due any person entitled to a priority or preference under the laws of the United 
States." Id. 
48 See Note, supra note 38, at 136. 
49 See Pearlstein, supra note 43, at 633. "Section 64a(l) was amended in 1952 to provide 
that 'where an order is entered in a proceeding under any chapter of this act [of 1952] directing 
that bankruptcy be proceeded with, the costs and expenses of administration incurred in the 
ensuing bankruptcy proceeding shall have priority in advance of payment of the unpaid costs 
and expenses of administration, including the allowances provided for in such chapter, incurred 
in the superceded bankruptcy proceeding, in any .... The new language was provided to 
protect the Chapter 7 and to avoid the danger of a breakdown of administration.'" Id. 
50 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(A) (Supp. IV 1984): "(b) after notice and a hearing, there shall be 
allowed administrative claims, other than claims allowed under § 502(f) of this title including: 
(1)(A) the actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate, including, wages, 
salaries, or commissions for services rendered after commencement of the case." Id. The 
similarity of section 64(a)(I) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 and 503(b)(1)(A) of the current 
Bankruptcy Code allow the courts to view pre-code cases as relevant in interpreting the 
"administrative nature of a claim." See Note, supra note 38, at 137, citing NORTON, BANK-
RUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.11 (1984). 
51 See Note, supra note 38, at 137. 
52 See generally In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
53 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(A). 
54 See Note, supra note 38, at 137 (citing In re Mammoth Mart, 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 
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Administrative expense priority also assures that efficient admin-
istration does not go unrewarded. 55 By encouraging third party in-
teraction, the Code achieves one of two purposes: 1) rehabilitation 
of a debtor's estate under Chapter 11; or 2) preservation of assets 
of the estate for liquidation under Chapter 7. 56 Both efforts of the 
trustee ultimately benefit the creditors in either Chapter 11 or Chap-
ter 7. As one court has explained: "Without a provision for admin-
istrative expense priority, 'efforts to reorganize would be hampered 
by the necessity of prepayment for all goods and services supplied 
to the estate, since presumably no creditor would willingly assume 
the status of a non-priority creditor to a debtor undergoing reorga-
nization. "'57 
Traditionally, the administrative expense has been utilized to as-
sure continued business transactions. 58 In this sense the expenses 
are "necessary. "59 Without regular business relations with third par-
ties, reorganization could be impossible and could lead to an econom-
ically wasteful liquidation. 60 If a company liquidates, the administra-
tive expense priority allows compensation for those managing and 
liquidating the estate. 61 Courts are now extending the meaning of 
"necessary" to include compliance with state laws. 62 Payment of such 
claims neither rehabilitates the estate nor preserves its assets, yet 
based on a public policy of protecting the environment, courts are 
broadening the meaning of "necessary" to enforce environmental 
clean-up orders. 63 
C. Courts' Treatment of Section 503(b)(1)(Aj: A Review of Four 
Relevant Criteria 
The range of claims allowed as administrative expenses against a 
bankrupt estate indicate a court's broad discretion in determining 
whether to elevate a claim to administrative expense status. 64 Sec-
1976)). The value of the business decreases when customers and dealers will not continue to 
deal with the bankrupt estate. Generally such interaction will increase the assets for all 
creditors. Administrative expense priority assures payment to those who continue dealing 
with the company. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57Id. (citing In re Jartran, Inc., 732 F.2d 584, 586 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
58 See Mammoth Mart, 536 F.2d at 954. 
59 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 21, § 503.20. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. §§ 503.19-503.20. 
62 See In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 782 n.7 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
63 Id. 
64 See Note, supra note 38, at 137. 
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tion 503(b)(1)(A) of the Code allows payment as administrative ex-
penses of the actual and necessary costs of preserving the estate. 65 
Courts consider several factors when determining whether a claim 
fits under section 503. Specifically the claims must: 1) arise post-
petition; 2) benefit the estate; 3) be necessary to prevent imminent 
harm; and 4) in the environmental area, be of a non-monetary na-
ture. 66 
The first factor is whether goods or services were acquired by the 
estate after the filing of bankruptcy.67 Courts follow the general rule 
that post-petition filing is required to distinguish the claims as "nec-
essary" to the estate. 68 In re Giltex, in which goods delivered to the 
debtor several hours prior to filing were not treated as administra-
tive expenses, illustrates the strict enforcement of the post-petition 
filing rule by the courts. 69 
In the environmental area the post-petition rule takes on a new 
meaning. In many cases the hazardous waste was stored on the 
property before the filing of bankruptcy. 70 Usually such a pre-petition 
storage condition gives rise to a general, unsecured claim. 71 As il-
lustrated in In re Stevens, however, some courts may allow admin-
istrative expense priority for conditions created pre-petition. 72 Gen-
erally, when the debtor creates the hazard post-petition, clean-up 
orders can be treated as administrative expenses. 73 These somewhat 
different positions indicate the tension between the policy of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the policy of protecting the environment. 74 
The second factor required to classify a claim as an administrative 
expense is that the goods or services giving rise to the claim benefit 
65 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(A) (emphasis added). 
66 See infra notes 68-94 and accompanying text. 
67 Note, supra note 38, at 138 (citing NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 12.05 
(1984)). 
68 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(I) (1982). 
69 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1066 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
70 See generally Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985); In re 
Dant & Russell, Inc., 61 Bankr. 668 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985), afI'd No. 86-4435, (9th Cir. August 
2, 1988). 
71 In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 762,768 n.5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
72 See In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
73 See In re Pierce Coal & Constr., 65 Bankr. 521,531 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). 
74 See infra notes 252-82 and accompanying text. If the policy of protecting the environment 
at any cost prevailed, the creation of a hazardous condition pre or post-petition would have 
no bearing on environmental cleanup. That courts recognize the general post-petition rule 
even in environmental cases indicates an appreciation of the Code's priorities and a lack of a 
comprehensive environmental clean-up plan in bankruptcy. 
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the estate. 75 For example, in MaUer of Chicago, Rock Island and 
Pacific Railroad Company v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 76 
the court refused to allow an administrative expense for the removal 
of old railroad lines. 77 The removal might have benefitted creditors 
by eliminating the possibility of a tort claim. 78 The court, however, 
concluded that the benefit was too slight, indirect, and conjectural 
to justify classifying the expense as administrative. 79 
When the debtor stores toxic material, the requirement of a ben-
efit to the estate is expressed in terms of the threat of imminent 
harm8°-the third element of administrative expense categorizing. 
When determining the parameters of the actual and necessary ex-
penses of preserving the estate,81 courts have found that debtors 
cannot abandon toxic waste in contravention of state health laws 
designed to protect the public health and safety from identified 
hazards. 82 In Stevens, 83 the court explained the imminent harm and 
benefit to the estate standards in light of the Code's provisions for 
abandonment. 84 The explanation describes a need to prioritize toxic 
waste cleanup: 
The clean up did confer benefit on the debtor's estate by 
bringing the estate into compliance with the cleanup mandate of 
state and federal law and by protecting the estate from increased 
liability [by abandonment] which would result in the event of 
spill .... Accordingly, the cleanup costs should be allowed as 
an administrative expense. 85 
The decision in Ohio v. Kovacs completes the picture of the treat-
ment of clean-up orders as administrative expenses in bankruptcy 
proceedings.86 The Court describes the fourth test to determine 
administrative claim status. The Supreme Court held that Ohio's 
claim against a debtor for toxic waste cleanup was a money judgment 
and therefore dischargable in bankruptcy.87 The language suggesting 
75 In re Mammoth Mart, 536 F.2d 950, 954 (1st Cir. 1976). 
76 756 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1985). 
77 Id. at 520. 
78Id. 
79Id. 
80 See id. 
81 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(A). 
82 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, 762, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986). 
83 See In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
87 See id. at 285. That a receiver had taken control of the company's operations and it was 
therefore impossible to comply with the clean-up order, also influenced the court. Id. at 263. 
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that the clean-up order had been converted into an obligation to pay 
money forced courts to reevaluate the actual nature of a clean-up 
order.88 The ensuing struggle, fueled by dicta in Kovacs, has left the 
courts divided, but the struggle seems to be yielding to a popular 
willingness to allow administrative claims for the cleanup of hazard-
ous waste. 89 By distinguishing fact patterns from the facts of 
Kovacs9o and using the imminent harm criteria of Midlantic National 
Bank,91 some courts have found the clean up of toxic waste an 
appropriate administrative expense. 92 The extent to which the clean-
up priority will disrupt the Code's provisions remains to be seen, 
especially when the estate does not have enough money to pay the 
secured creditors. 93 
III. THE DECISIONS OF KOVACS AND MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK 
With concern for a clean environment as a background, courts also 
look to what restricts their equitable power to enforce state envi-
ronmentallaws-namely, the Kovacs precedent, the no-benefit rule, 
the pre-petition rule, the imminent danger standard, and the prac-
tical concern of the financial restraints of the estate. A legitimate 
question is whether the administrative claim provision provides ad-
equate statutory authority to overcome these obstacles. In some 
cases the answer is yes. 94 This section explores the decisions in Ohio 
v. Kovacs and Midlantic National Bank. While Kovacs appears to 
restrict the enforcement of clean-up orders, the language and dicta 
of the case suggest that policy concerns will playa role in overcoming 
statutory mandates. Midlantic National Bank explicitly recognizes 
the importance of a safe environment as reason enough to allow 
administrative expense status for clean-up orders. 
A. Ohio v. Kovacs 
Before evaluating these obstacles as applied to recent cases, a 
review of Ohio v. Kovacs illustrates the Supreme Court's effort to 
keep the Code intact as a shelter for orderly reorganization and 
88 Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1984). 
89 See In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. at 783; see, e.g., In re Pierce Coal & Constr., 65 Bankr. 521, 
540 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). 
00 See Southern Ry. v. Johnson Bronze, 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 1985). 
91 See infra notes 124-44 and accompanying text. 
92 See infra notes 220-47 and accompanying text. 
93 See In re T.P. Long Chemical, Inc., 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985). 
94 See infra notes 143-247 and accompanying text. 
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liquidation. 95 In Kovacs, Chern-Dyne Corporation ("Chern-Dyne") 
operated a hazardous waste management facility in Hamilton, Ohio.96 
The state initiated an action under Ohio law against Chern-Dyne for 
the pollution of waters97 and public nuisance. 98 After Chern-Dyne 
failed to comply with a court-imposed clean-up order, the court 
appointed a receiver to implement the order. 99 
Before the receiver could complete the task, Kovacs, a shareholder 
of the company and its chief executive officer, filed for reorganization 
under Chapter 11 of the Code. loo Subsequently, at Kovacs's request, 
the court converted the proceeding to one of liquidation under Chap-
ter 7.101 The state then filed an action to declare Kovacs's obligation 
nondischargeable in bankruptcy.lo2 Ohio asserted two arguments, 
both of which the Supreme Court rejected. lo3 
First, the state argued that it did not have a claim against Kovacs 
under Code section 101(4) because "breach of performance" does not 
include a violation of state statute. If the state did not have a claim 
against Kovacs, then under the Code, the state's "nonclaim" is not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy.104 Under section 101(4) of the Code 
breach of performance is a claim. lo5 Therefore, if Kovacs's inaction 
is described as a "breach of performance" the state's demand for 
95 See genemlly Note, Dumping Waste, Discharging Debts: Ohio v. Kovacs (Kovacs II), 13 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 661 (1986). 
96 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 276 (1985). 
97 See id., referring to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.04 (Baldwin 1977). 
98 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 276. 
99 [d. 
100 [d. 
101 [d. at 276 n.1. 
102 [d. at 276-77. 
103 [d. at 284-85. 
104 See id. at 278-79; Note, supra note 96, at 663 n.17. 
The distinction between a "claim" and what could be called a "non-claim" is essential 
to an understanding of Kovacs II. The advantage of having a "claim" against a debtor 
is that it provides a party with "creditor" status, see 11 U.S.C. § 101(9) (1982) 
(defining "creditor" in part as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor") and 
enables the creditor to share in the distribution of the bankruptcy estate, see id. 
§ 726 (providing for distribution of the estate based on claims against the estate). 
The disadvantage of having a claim is that the claim, as a debt of the bankrupt 
individual, is dischargeable in bankruptcy .... Thus, if the bankruptcy estate is 
insufficient to satisfy the claim, the individual debtor is freed from any further 
obligation to the creditor. By the same token, a "nonclaim" does not entitle a party 
to share in the bankruptcy estate, but it has the advantage of not being dischargeable 
in bankruptcy. Therefore, if Ohio did not have a "claim" against Kovacs, it would be 
entitled to enforce the clean up obligation against him after bankruptcy. 
Note, supra note 96, at 663 n.17; see, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) (1982). 
105 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). 
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action is dischargeable. l06 Ohio asserted that "breach of perfor-
mance" applies only in commercial settings. 107 The Court rejected 
this position, finding that Ohio had conceded that the $75,000 injury 
to wildlife claim was within section 101(4).108 Because the wildlife 
claim and clean-up order both arose from the violation of statutes, 
the Court found no reason to distinguish the twO.109 Looking to 
legislative history, the Court also found congressional intent to give 
"claim" a broad reading. 110 
The Court also dismissed Ohio's second contention, that its claim 
was not a money judgment.ll1 Under the Code money judgments 
used to enforce police powers are dischargeable. 112 With a receiver 
in control of the site to shield Kovacs from "personally taking charge 
of . . . the removal of wastes . . . "113 the Court held that the state 
effectively converted Kovacs's affirmative responsibility into a 
money judgment.114 The Court found that "[ w ]hat the receiver 
wanted from Kovacs after Bankruptcy was the money to defray clean 
up costs. "115 
Having decided that the cost of cleanup was dischargeable in 
bankruptcy, the Court distinguished Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department 
of Environmental Resources. 116 In Penn Terra, "there had been no 
106 See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 279-80. 
107 [d. at 279. 
108 [d. 
109 [d. 
110 [d.; see also Note, supra note 96, at 665 n.31: 
'claim' was described as allowing 'all obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote 
or contingent . . . to be dealt with in the bankruptcy case.' A broad definition of 
'claim' serves at least two purposes. First, it effectuates the 'fresh start' purpose of 
the Bankruptcy Code because the individual debtor's liability on a claim is discharge-
able under the Code [see 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) 
(1982)]. Second, it gives potential creditors the greatest access to the estate in order 
to satisfy the unmet obligations of the debtor because a 'claim' is a prerequisite to a 
share in the estate. 
See Note, supra note 96, at 665 n.31. 
III See Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982). Under this section 
money judgments to enforce police or regulatory powers are subject to the automatic stay, 
and are therefore dischargeable. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5). 
112 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5). 
113 See Kovacs 469 U.S. at 283. 
114 [d. at 282. 
115 [d. at 283. 
116 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984). In Penn Terra, a mining company operated several mines 
in violation of various state environmental protection statutes. [d. at 269 n.1. The state of 
Pennsylvania filed for an injunction for the clean-up of the mines. Before the company complied 
with the clean-up order, it filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 7. The court considered the 
following issues when ruling that the injunction was nondischargeable: that in its form and 
substance the equitable remedy of injunction is not traditionally associated with the charac-
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appointment of a receiver who had the duty to comply with the state 
law and who was seeking money from the bankrupt. "117 
Another distinction the Court made when deciding Kovacs was 
the effect on the trustee's action if a receiver had not been ap-
pointed:118 
Had no receiver been appointed prior to Kovacs's bankruptcy, 
the trustee would have been charged with the duty of collecting 
Kovacs's nonexempt property and administering it. If the site 
at issue were Kovacs's property, the trustee would shortly de-
termine whether it was of value to the estate. If the property 
was worth more than the costs of bringing it into compliance 
with state law, the trustee would undoubtedly sell it for its net 
value, and the buyer would clean up the property, in which event 
whatever obligation Kovacs might have had to clean up the 
property would have been satisfied. If the property were worth 
less than the clean up, the trustee would likely abandon it to its 
prior owner, who would have to comply with the state environ-
mental law to the extent of his or its ability. 119 
Although Kovacs is often cited as a landmark decision adversely 
affecting environmental claims, the Court's reasoning and dicta in 
fact open the door for allowance of administrative status for clean-
up orders. 120 The main limitation the case creates-unenforceability 
of money judgments-is itself overshadowed by the receiver's taking 
over the estate. 121 The applicability of Kovacs for avoiding adminis-
trative expense status is limited to clear monetary claims. 122 
B. Midlantic National Bank 
With the Midlantic National Bank123 decision the Court has lim-
ited the ability of a trustee in bankruptcy to abandon hazardous 
waste properties. In Midlantic, Quanta Resources Corporation 
teristics of a money judgment-which is a remedy intended for compensation of past injuries 
tl1at is not reduceable to a certain sum. Additionally, monies were not sought by the Com-
monwealth as creditor or obligee, money could not satisfy the Commonwealth, and the remedy 
was designed to prevent future harm and restore the environment. Id. at 278. 
117 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283 n.ll. 
118 See Note, supra note 95, at 667. 
119 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 284-85 n.12. 
120 See In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 783 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
121 Kovacs, 469 U.S. at 283. 
122 Compare Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 278 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (injunction compelling expenditure is the type of remedy associated with a money 
judgment). The court, finding that most injunctive orders compel expenditure, stated that 
"almost everything costs something." Id. 
123 See infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text. 
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("Quanta"), a waste oil processing company, accepted 400,000 gallons 
of PCB contaminated oil in violation of its operating permit. 124 Before 
the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection 
("NJDEP") and Quanta could negotiate a clean-up plan, Quanta filed 
for reorganization under Chapter 11. 125 The next day, NJDEP filed 
an administrative order to clean up the site. 126 Due to its perilous 
financial state, Quanta converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation and 
sought to abandon the property under section 554(a).127 The Court 
held that a trustee may not abandon property in "contravention of 
a state statute or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect 
the public health or safety from identified hazards. "128 The Court 
rejected Quanta's contention that the automatic stay129 provision 
prevented the state from enforcing environmental laws. 130 Generally, 
the automatic stay provision prevents creditors from enforcing a 
judgment against the debtor.131 
124 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, 757, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986). 
125Id. 
126Id. 
127 I d. at 758. 
128 I d. at 762 (footnote omitted). 
129 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982) provides: 
Id. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under 
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of 
the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3)), operates as 
a stay, applicable to all entities, of -
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance of employment of 
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor 
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under 
this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement 
of the case under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against the property of the estate, of 
a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the 
estate or to excercise control over property of the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien 
to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of 
the case under this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement 
of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States 
Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
lao See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, 761, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 
(1986). 
131 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
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In its analysis, the Midlantic Court pointed to dicta in Kovacs 132 
suggesting that the bankruptcy trustee must comply with state laws 
designed to protect public health and safety. 133 In addition, the Court 
emphasized statutory exceptions, such as section 362(b)(5), permit-
ting the government to enforce "nonmonetary" judgments against 
the debtor's estate. 134 The Midlantic Court explained that the leg-
islative history of section 362(a) indicates that the exception's pur-
pose is to protect public health and safety.135 Moreover, the Court 
found congressional intent against the Code's pre-emption of state 
laws in 28 U.S.C. § 959(b), which commands a trustee in bankruptcy 
to "manage and operate the property in his possession ... according 
to the requirements of the valid laws of the state. "136 
In the face of the expanded power of section 362, which seemed 
to foreclose the state's efforts to enforce anti-pollution laws,137 Con-
gress overruled such broad language in its 1978 version of the Bank-
ruptcy Rules of 1973. 138 Before 1978 the Code in effect protected 
polluters. 139 The 1978 amendments clarified Congress's intention to 
enforce environmental laws. 140 
These expressions of congressional intent to protect the environ-
ment from toxic pollution in the bankruptcy area reflect an expanded 
effort to control the treatment, disposal and storage of hazardous 
waste. 141 In Midlantic, the Court viewed the wave of congressional 
1:12469 U.S. 274 (1985). 
1:J:1 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 760. 
l'4Id. at 761; see infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text. 
la5 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 761. "Thus, where a governmental unit is suing 
a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer protection, 
safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such 
a law, the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay." Id. (emphasis supplied). 
136 See id. Section 959(b) is a section of Judiciary and Judicial Procedure. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-
2906 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
137 Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 761 n.6 (citing Hillside Foundry Co. v. Michigan ex 
rel. Kelly, 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 195 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1974), "action by Michigan 
Attorney General to enforce State's antipollution laws held subject to automatic stay. The 
House Report also referred to an unreported case from Texas where a stay prevented the 
state of Maine from closing down a debtor's plant that was polluting a river in violation of the 
State's environmental protection laws.") Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 761, discussing 
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 174, 175, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6134-36. 
13R Id. 
139 Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 761. 
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1982). 
141 See Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 690l-6987 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Act to 
monitor waste from creation to after disposal; authorizes U. S. to seek judicial or administrative 
restraint of activities involving hazardous wastes that "present imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment.") 42 U.S.C. § 6973; CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. 
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action favoring environmental protection as overshadowing the aban-
donment provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 142 Moreover, public 
concern about the storage of hazardous waste in some instances 
supersedes statutory dictates of the Bankruptcy Code. 143 
IV. SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW: THE CONTINUING INFLUENCE OF 
OHIO V. KOVACS AND MIDLANTIC NATIONAL BANK 
In light of Kovacs, any agency seeking to enforce an environmental 
order against a bankrupt estate should not phrase the order in terms 
of monetary relief. 144 In the wake of Midlantic and Kovacs the other 
factors, "no benefit, no burden," pre-petition filing, and imminent 
danger, have influenced courts in varying degrees. A review of the 
relevant case law interpreting these factors reveals a wide range of 
decisions not easily reconciled. 
While the no benefit no burden prong has a statutory basis, the 
Supreme Court has limited its value in the environmental area. 
Under section 554(a) of the Code a trustee can abandon "any prop-
erty of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of 
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate."145 Midlantic, how-
ever, restricts abandonment power when it would threaten public 
health and safety. 146 If trustees cannot abandon the real estate, then 
they must comply with state environmental laws. 147 It follows that 
the cost then becomes an "actual and necessary" administrative cost 
under section 503(b)(1)(A).148 
§§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (establishes fund to finance toxic waste clean-up and 
seek reinbursement from responsible parties; also empowers Federal Government to pursue 
relief necessary to prevent imminent harm to public health from release of hazardous sub-
stances). 
142 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, 762, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 
(1986). 
143Id. While the Court did not expressly hold that environmental policy supersedes the 
Code, its statutory interpretation revealed a bias in favor of non-abandonment and therefore 
cleanup. See generally Note, The Future of the Environmental Enforcement Injunction after 
Ohio v. Kovacs, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 397, 397-401 (1986). 
144 See generally Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); see also Penn Terra, 733 F.2d 267 
(3d Cir. 1984) (court vigorously defends the position that the claim is not monetary). 
145 11 U. S. C. § 554(a). 
146 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 106 S. Ct. at 760. 
147 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
148 See In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 782 n.7 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). Before Midlantic, in In 
re Wall Tube & Metal Products, 56 Bankr. 918 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986), the court declined 
to allow priority status to sampling and analyses of hazardous wastes. Because neither the 
estate nor its creditors benefitted, the court reasoned that the costs of such testing were not 
"actual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate within the meaning of 
§ 503(b)." Id. 
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In the wake of Midlantic, the policy exception to the benefit! 
burden abandonment criterion appears to be settled in favor of en-
vironmental enforcement. In In re Stevens, debtors stored PCB-
contaminated oil in violation of State Department of Environmental 
Protection orders to remove it. 149 The In re Stevens court held that 
the trustee could not abandon the property even though the property 
did not benefit the estate. 150 
Allowing the trustee to abandon the waste, reasoned the court, 
would result in reverting title to individual debtors, who would be 
without the resources to dispose of the oil. 151 The estate would then 
be violating certain state environmental laws. Under the state's 
environmental protection statute, the trustee would be permitting a 
threatened discharge. 152 Ongoing storage violated state law,153 and 
revesting title in debtors would constitute a discharge by the 
trustee. 1M Abandoning the waste, therefore, would violate the 
state's public policy expressed by statute and affirmed by the Su-
preme Court in Midlantic. 155 The clear language of Midlantic enables 
courts to invoke the public policy of protecting health and safety to 
temper the Code's abandonment provisions. 
Whereas Midlantic's decree on abandonment is clear, the specifics 
of what constitutes "imminent danger"156 have yet to be determined. 
If a court classifies hazardous waste storage as imminently danger-
ous, the court will not allow the trustee to abandon the property. In 
Midlantic, Justice Powell stated that "[t]he Bankruptcy Code does 
not have the power to authorize an abandonment without formulat-
ing conditions that will adequately protect the public's health and 
safety. "157 Powell did not expand on what conditions will adequately 
protect the public health from "imminent and identifiable harm. "158 
Whether courts view identifiable harm as inherent in the storage of 
149 Stevens, 68 Bankr. at 776. 
150 See id. at 780. 
151 Id. at 780-81 n.6. 
152Id. 
153Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1306(1) (1987)). 
154 Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 1303(3) (defining "disposal" as including the 
placing of hazardous waste so that the hazardous waste may enter the environment), 1317 
(defining discharge as including "disposing"), 1317 A (prohibiting discharge of hazardous ma-
terial). 
155Id. (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 38, § 1302 ("waste oil if not properly handled, is a 
threat to the public health, safety, and welfare and to the environment and therefore must 
be controlled")). 
156 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, 762 (1986). 
157Id. 
158 Id. at 762-63 n.9. 
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toxic waste or whether the debtor can take appropriate measures to 
protect public safety determines whether the court will allow aban-
donment. 159 
At one end of the spectrum are the cases that consider environ-
mental laws but do not demand full compliance with those laws. 160 
For example, in In re Franklin Signal Corp., the court interpreted 
Midlantic to mean that the trustee "only needs to take adequate 
precautionary measures to ensure that there is no imminent danger 
to the public as a result of abandonment. "161 The court formulated 
five criteria to be considered before abandonment would be permis-
sible: "1) the imminence of danger to public health and safety, 2) the 
extent of probable harm, 3) the amount and type of hazardous waste, 
4) the cost to bring the property into compliance with environmental 
laws, and 5) the amount and type of funds for cleanup. "162 Applying 
these considerations to the facts of the case-storage of fourteen 
drums of hazardous chemicals-the court concluded that although 
the drums were in a deteriorating condition they did not pose a 
threat to public health. 163 
In a footnote, the court rejected the holding of In re Oklahoma 
Refining Co., that the court need only "take environmental laws and 
regulations into consideration."164 The Franklin court determined 
that Midlantic required more than mere consideration but something 
less than full compliance. 165 
To support this interpretation of Midlantic, the Franklin court 
reasoned that strict compliance would leave the trustee helpless. 166 
On the one hand, without funds the trustee could not pay for the 
cleanup.167 On the other hand, the court could not authorize aban-
donment if abandonment would contravene state environmental 
laws. 168 The court speculated that the result would be an abandon-
IC,,, See id. at 766 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
WI) See, e.g., In re Franklin Signal Corp., 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 55,59 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1986); In re Oklahoma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562, 566 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1986); see alsu In 
re Catamount Dyers, Inc., 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 321, 323 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (decided 
before the Supreme Court decision in Midlantic and accepting the dissent in the Third Circuit 
decision of the same case). 
Hil Franklill, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 57. 
iii" Id. 
w:lld. at 59. 
iH4 lri. at 57 n.4 (quoting II/ re Oklahuma Refining Co., 63 Bankr. 562 (Bankr. W. D. Okla. 
1986). 
llie, Franklin, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 57 n.4. 
Wlild. at 57 n.5. 
1l17Iri. 
wx Id. 
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ment by default under 11 U.S.C. 554(c).169 If a trustee abandons 
property by default the property reverts to the debtor who usually 
does not have the funds to pay for cleanup yo 
This reasoning led the court to assume that the majority in Mid-
lantic did not intend such a result. 171 After explaining five factors, 
the imminence of danger, the extent of possible harm, the amount 
or type of hazardous waste, the cost to bring the property in com-
pliance with environmental laws, and the amount of funds available, 
the court concluded that a trustee take only precautionary measures 
to secure the waste before abandonment. 172 The court also rested its 
conclusion on a distinction of the facts of Midlantic. Midlantic in-
volved 470,000 gallons of highly toxic and carcinogenic waste which 
presented risks of fire, explosion and death. 173 The Franklin case 
"is not nearly as alarming with respect to the amount and type of 
waste. The issue is not one of public safety but one of money; who 
must bear the cost of clean-up."174 The Franklin court appears to 
have relied on the degree of harm, perhaps ignoring Powell's im-
minent and identifiable harm standard. 175 
Conversely, there are cases that do not allow abandonment and 
require administrative expense priority for the cleanup of toxic 
waste. 176 In In re Stevens, the trustee of a bankrupt estate sought 
to secure twenty-nine drums of PCB-contaminated waste by storing 
them in a tractor trailer, roping off the area and posting warning 
signs. 177 The Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") in-
formed the trustee that such storage was inadequate. 178 When the 
trustee failed to comply with the pertinent storage regulations, the 
DEP contracted for the removal at a cost of $7572.20. 179 The DEP 
169 11 U .s.c. § 554(c) provides: "any property scheduled under section 521(1) of this title is 
not otherwise administered at the time of the closing of a case is abandoned to the debtor and 
administered for purposes of section 350 of this title." 
170 Franklin, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) at 57 n.5. 
171 Id. at 57-58 n.5. 
In See id. at 57-59. 
173 Id. at 59 n.9. 
174 Id. 
175 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct 755, 762, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 
(1986). 
17Ii See 111 re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 783 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987); In re T.P. Long Chern., 
Inc., 45 Bankr. 278, 286, 289 (pre-Midlantic Nat'l Bank decision barring estate from escaping 
liability by abandoning drums of waste). 
177 Stevens, 68 Bankr. at 776. 
1" Id. 
179Id. at 776. Absent indications from the court in Midlantic Nat'l Bank, state law deter-
mines what constitutes conditions which adequately protect the public's health and safety. See 
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sought reversal of the Bankruptcy court decision that did not allow 
recovery of this amount as an administrative expense. 180 
In allowing recovery and rejecting the trustee's attempt to aban-
don the property, the Stevens court supported the public policy of 
protecting health and safety: 
Midlantic leaves no room for the estate to avoid the admin-
istrative expense attendant upon its possession of hazardous 
waste, except upon the acquiescence of the public authorities 
whose ultimate legal obligation it is to protect the public health 
and safety from hazardous waste abandoned by those responsible 
for its existence. 18! 
The Court continued that: "[u]nless Midlantic is to be disregarded 
the trustee may not be permitted simply to walk away from hazard-
ous wastes in circumstances where the bankruptcy court itself would 
be powerless to authorize their' abandonment. "182 
By not removing the waste the trustee became liable under Maine 
law for its cleanup.183 The deference of the In re Stevens court to 
state law contrasts with the Franklin court's willingness to set 
judicial standards for the cleanup of toxic waste. 184 The conflict in 
applying judicial authority illustrates the different approaches to 
public policy. By deferring to state law, supposedly under the au-
thority of Midlantic, the In re Stevens court avoided the public policy 
issue of determining public safety standards under the Code. By 
setting a judicial standard for public policy, the Franklin court 
reconciled federal and state law. This reconciliation, however, is at 
the expense of dictating state public policy, which is normally a state 
legislative function. 
A flexible approach to the administrative claim issue was used in 
In re Peerless. 185 There, the Bankruptcy Court allowed administra-
tive claim status for a clean-up order issued under CERCLA.186 
id. at 782 n.7. In this case the conditions were not met. Id. (which set of conditions is a 
"quintessential legislative determination"). 
18(\ See id. at 777. 
'" Id. at 781. The Stevens court realized that curbing the power of the bankruptcy court 
involved balancing public health and safety with the "more parochial concerns of efficient 
bankruptcy administration." Id. The Maine court subscribed to the premise that actual and 
necessary expenses include those expenses incurred to comply with state laws. See id. at 782 
n.7. 
1H2 I d. at 782. 
!X:l Id. 
1H4 See id. 
18G In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). 
!Xli Id. at 948-49. 
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Although the trustee argued that the violation arose pre-petition, 
the court found that the bankrupt estate was an owner and therefore 
liable under CERCLA.ls7 In a footnote the court recognized the 
tension between the Code and the Midlantic decision. ISS 
The most significant aspect of In re Peerless is the court's effort 
to enforce the CERCLA order. There was no indication that the 
waste posed any imminent harm.lS9 Further, the trustee argued for 
equitable subordination of EPA's claim because of alleged bad 
faith. 190 In direct defiance of a court order, the EPA had entered the 
property to clean up the waste. 191 The EPA petitioned the court for 
administrative expense priority long after the cleanup was com-
plete. 192 The court concluded that a lack of bankruptcy expertise 
rather than malice prompted the EPA's erroneous actions. 193 Based 
on the record as a whole, the court granted administrative expense 
status. 194 
The ability of the court in In re Peerless to weigh the evidence 
and measure the credibility of witnesses validated the proceeding. 
Allowing an adjudication of the administrative claim expense issue 
permits a balanced approach to the individual bankruptcy. In this 
case a superlien statute would automatically allow recovery for the 
EPA without an appraisal of possible bad faith or malicious prose-
cution or whether in fact the waste posed imminent harm to the 
area. 
What constitutes imminent harm thus remains open to judicial 
determination, as does the fourth prong of the administrative claim 
test-the necessity that the claim be post-petition. 195 Some courts 
have strictly adhered to the post-petition requirement. Various 
courts, however, circumvent the post-petition claim requirement, 
invoking public policy concerns to overcome statutory construction. 
Southern Railway Co. v. Johnson Bronze CO.196 supports the prop-
osition that a bankruptcy court has no authority to elevate a pre-
187 [d. at 948. 
ISS [d. at 947 n.l. 
IR9 See id. at 947. In fact an inspector had dipped his hands into the drums of chemicals 
without harm. [d. 




194 See id. at 947. 
195 See supra notes 68-79 and accompanying text describing policy of allowing post-petition 
debts priority status as well as the theory that pre-petition claims should not be allowed 
because creditors usually bear the risk of dealing with the corporation of their choice. 
19" 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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petition unsecured claim to an administrative priority.197 There, 
Southern Railway brought an action seeking to hold the debtor in 
possession liable for the cleanup of hazardous waste that the debtor 
had deposited into a drainage ditch. 198 The debtor's successor in title 
cross-claimed for the cost of removing the sludge, and filed a claim 
for administrative priority to collect the money it expended in clean-
ing up the site. 199 Relying on Kovacs, the Southern Railway court 
found that both claims were general and unsecured. 20o The admin-
istrative order issued by the South Carolina Department of Health 
and Environment to clean up the waste could not elevate the clean-
up order to priority status 201 because the clean-up order itself was 
general and unsecured pursuant to Kovacs. 202 
The Southern Railway court reasoned that the claim was pre-
petition because the parties knew of the waste disposal and because 
the Johnson license to operate was founded on the notion that "J ohn-
son maintain the ditch, restore it to its original condition, and in-
demnify Southern for any liability arising from its use. "203 Because 
Kovacs did not decide the legal consequences of a debtor entering 
into bankruptcy prior to receivership, that case could not be viewed 
as determinative of priority status. 204 
Similarly, in In re Dant & Russel, Inc.,205 the court disallowed 
administrative priority to costs for hazardous waste cleanup incurred 
before a petition for bankruptcy.206 The district court, affirming the 
decision, also stated that environmental authorities identified the 
toxic waste problem post-petition, and the lessor in possession in-
I", Id. at 142. 
19H Id. at 138. The court assumed that the private party liable for clean up costs enjoyed 
the same rights against the debtor as did the state. See id. at 141; see also In re Stevens, 68 
Bankr. 774, 780 n.5 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987); In re Pierce Coal and Constr. Inc., 65 Bankr. 521, 
525 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). 
199 758 F.2d at 138. 
200ld. at 141. 
201 Seeid. 
21" Id. 
2o:l I d. at 139. 
21)4 See also In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co., 56 Bankr. 918, 927 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 
1986) (allowing administrative expense for clean up of drums containing hazardous waste is 
"judicially legislating ... by stretching § 503(b) beyond its scope"). There is the "potential 
for unwittingly creating an incentive for governmental authorities to postpone environmental 
clean up activities for financially strategic reasons in order to gain the advantage of priority 
treatment in a bankruptcy context. In addition, there is a danger of dissipating and depleting 
those funds which under the current statutory design are essential for an effective adminis-
tration of the estate." Id. 
200 61 Bankr. 668 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985), a/I'd, 67 Bankr. 360, 365 (D. Or. 1986). 
200 61 Bankr. at 670-71. 
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curred the costs to mitigate the hazards under the agreement with 
the EPA post-petition as well. 207 Although the court found that the 
debtor's liability for damages arose before Chapter 11, the post-
petition identification did not trigger an administrative priority for 
cleanup.208 The court also distinguished Midlantic, but seemed to 
rest its conclusion on the fact that the contamination occurred pre-
petition. 209 
Following the line of cases disallowing pre-petition claims, the 
court in In re Pierce Coal and Construction Inc., 210 considered the 
priority status of the costs of reclaiming land disturbed by strip 
mining.211 The debtor mining company operated for a year after its 
Chapter 11 petition was filed before converting to a liquidation pro-
ceeding under Chapter 7. 212 After the debtor filed the Chapter 7 
petition, the company continued to operate for an additional thirty 
days.213 The bankruptcy court concluded that the priority of the 
reclamation costs would turn on the timing of the operations, 
whether before or after the debtor filed a petition for bankruptcy. 214 
The court determined that the costs incurred after the filing were 
entitled to administrative priority under section 503(b)(I)(A)'s "ac-
tual and necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate 
.... "215 The court concluded that with one exception, pre-petition 
costs could not be accorded administrative expense priority. Agree-
ing with Southern Railway, the court expressed concern that it 
lacked authority to elevate pre-petition claims to administrative 
priority status. 216 
The court did, however, recognize Midlantic's imminent and iden-
tifiable harm exception to the general rule: 
The United States Supreme Court has indicated in its decision 
that when imminent and identifiable harm is present, the prior-
ities of the Bankruptcy Code may be subservient to the environ-
'07 Dant, 67 Bankr. at 362. 
208 See id. at 364. 
'09 [d. This decision conflicts with Stevens and Pierce Coal in that those decisions allowed 
administrative priority when the damage was done pre-petition. See supra notes 177-85 and 
accompanying text; see also i1lfra notes 211-19 and accompanying text. 
210 65 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1986). 
211 [d. at 525. 
'12 See id. at 522, 523. 
213 [d. at 523. 
214 See id. at 531. 
210 [d. at 530 ("The Bankruptcy Code clearly provides that expenses occasioned by the 
debtor in possession while operating as a debtor in possession are 'actual and necessary 
.... "'). 
216 [d. at 531. 
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mental laws designed to protect the public safety. It is reasonable 
to expect that under a given set of circumstances, the necessary 
costs of protecting the public health or safety from imminent and 
identifiable harm may be elevated to administrative priority and 
perhaps, even to a type of secured priority. 217 
A literal reading of the Code's language supports the Southern Rail-
way, In re Dant, and In re Pierce Coal courts' strict construction of 
the post-petition test. 218 
In contrast to these cases, the District Court of Maine decided 
that the post-petition cleanup of a pre-petition environmental hazard 
constituted a first priority administrative expense. 219 The court 
agreed with the Pierce Coal court that Midlantic had altered the 
criteria for determining the allowance of administrative expenses 
under section 503(b)(1)(A).220 When imminent and identifiable harm 
is present the mandate of the Code "may be subservient to state 
laws designed to protect public safety. "221 The court found such a 
danger and therefore the clean-up costs incurred in removing the 
twenty-nine barrels of PCB-contaminated oil were deemed to be an 
administrative expense. 222 
In In re Distrigas, 223 the Massachusetts bankruptcy court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the State 0: New Jersey was an im-
paired class and accordingly entitled to a confirmation vote of any 
reorganization plan. 224 New Jersey wanted to be classified as an 
impaired class because at least one entity within such a class must 
approve any reorganization plan. 225 The court held that the state 
was not an impaired class because New Jersey had taken no formal 
action to clean up Distrigas' toxic waste. 226 New Jersey was, how-
217Id. (the court did not find such a situation in this case). 
218 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) ("the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving 
the estate, including wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the com-
mencement of the case"). 
219 In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 780 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
220 Id. 
221 Id. (quoting In re Pierce Coal & Constr., Inc., 65 Bankr. 521,531 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 
1986)). 
222 I d. at 775, 783-84. 
223 In re Distrigas, 66 Bankr. 382 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). 
224 See id. 
225 See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(IO) (1982 & Supp. III 1985) states: "(a) The court shall 
confirm a plan only if all of the following requirments [inter alia] are met: 
(10) If a class of claims is impaired under the plan, at least one class of claims that is 
impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, determined without including any acceptance 
of the plan by any insider." 
226 Distrigas, 66 Bankr. at 385, 386. New Jersey did send a letter in an attempt to enforce 
its clean-up powers. Id. at 385. 
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ever, entitled to an administrative expense under Midlantic. 227 As 
in In re Dant, the toxic waste problem occurred before filing under 
Chapter 11.228 Unlike the Dant court, however, the Distrigas court 
advised New Jersey that under Midlantic it could obtain a first 
priority expense. 229 In In re Dant, the court disallowed administra-
tive expense priority, but in Distrigas the court allowed the admin-
istrative expense despite the fact that the conditions arose pre-
petition. Distinguishing the facts of the cases does not explain the 
divergent views of these courts. Both the Distrigas and the In re 
Dant courts purport to follow the post-petition rule. The divergent 
results, moreover, indicate the diverse interpretations of the rule. 
In re Hemingway Transport230 adds another twist to determining 
the priority of pre-petition liability for hazardous waste cleanup. 
After reviewing the pertinent cases, the Massachusetts bankruptcy 
court chose not to follow any of the holdings. 231 In Hemingway, the 
debtor sold contaminated property of Juniper Development Group 
for which the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Quality 
Engineering ("DEQE") had issued a clean-up order.232 Subsequently, 
the EPA discovered the waste and ordered its cleanup.233 Juniper 
filed an action seeking contribution from the trustee on the grounds 
that the trustee is liable under CERCLA.234 
After the court discussed the relevant cases, it determined that 
neither Kovacs nor Midlantic controlled. 235 Rather, relying on Read-
ing Co. v. Brown,236 the Hemingway court concluded that Juniper's 
claim rose to the level of an administrative expense, on a theory of 
"fairness to all persons having claims against an insolvent. "237 Com-
plying with section 64(a), the forerunner of sections 503 and 507,238 
the Supreme Court in Brown decided that when the receiver acted 
negligently within the scope of its authority such negligence gave 
227 [d. at 386. 
228 See id. at 385. 
229 [d. at 386. 
230 73 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987). 
231 [d. at 504. 
232 [d. at 496 (the property was contaminated with 12 barrels of hazardous waste). 
233 [d. 
234 [d. 
235 [d. at 504. 
236 391 U.S. 471 (1968). 
237 Hemingway, 73 Bankr. at 504 (quoting Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 477 (1968)). 
In Brown the Court allowed administrative expense status to a claimant whose property was 
damaged as a result of a fire negligently started on an adjoining parcel involved in a bankruptcy 
proceeding. 391 U.S. at 484. 
238 See Pearlstein, supra note 43, at 633. 
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rise to actual and necessary costs of operating the debtor's busi-
ness. 239 The Court noted the policy arguments against allowing an 
administrative claim: "1) that first priority status for negligence 
claims would not encourage third parties to deal with the insolvent 
business; 2) such status would reduce the amount of funds for un-
secured creditors; and 3) such status would discourage general cred-
itors from accepting arrangements. "240 Discussing the Supreme 
Court's observations, the Hemingway court concluded that since 
"the victims of receiver's negligence did not merely suffer injury but 
had an insolvent business thrust upon them by operation of law 
... , "241 it would offend notions of fairness to exclude tort creditors 
from an estate's assets. 242 
The Hemingway court found the facts in Brown more analagous 
to its own facts, and concluded that "if damages leading to a negli-
gence claim against a receiver qualify as administrative expenses 
then so do damages giving rise to a strict liability claim against a 
Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession under CERCLA."243 The court in 
Hemingway, therefore, skirted the issue of allowing an administra-
tive expense merely for the cleanup of environmental hazards by 
raising CERCLA violations to the level of a tort claim. Courts have 
recognized tort claims as proper administrative expenses since 
Brown. 244 
As courts struggle to resolve the post-petition problem, two lines 
of cases emerge-those which adhere unfailingly to the rule and 
those which defer to policy considerations to circumvent the rule. 
Southern Railway and In re Dant & Russell support the proposition 
that pre-petition environmental claims are general and unsecured. 
Other courts, notably the In re Stevens and Distrigas courts, rec-
ognize that in many instances environmental hazards are created 
pre-petition, but in light of Midlantic they hold that policy consid-
erations outweigh the mandates of the Code. Allowing courts to 
balance competing policies will not necessarily create neat precedent. 
In the tradition of equity courts, however, such a balancing promotes 
239 391 U.S. at 485. 
240 See also In re Hemingway Transport, 73 Bankr. at 504 (citing Reading Co. v.Brown, 
391 U.S. 471, 477 (1968». 
241 I d. at 504. 
242 Id. 
243 I d. at 505. 
244 See Note, supra note 38, at 152; cf. In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 756 F.2d 
517, 518-19 (7th Cir. 1985) (removal 0; old railroad tracks of bankrupt estate might be 
necessary to avert imminent danger; such a transaction would benefit the creditors by pro-
tecting the bankrupt estate against tort liability for crossing accidents). 
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what the Supreme Court in Brown terms "fairness to all persons 
having claims against an insolvent. "245 
No clear precedents emerge from a survey of the recent law 
concerning the administrative claim provision in section 503(b)(1)(A). 
Courts use various approaches depending on their readings of Ohio 
v. Kovacs and Midlantic National Bank as well as their interpre-
tations of the post-petition and no benefit/no burden rules. What 
does emerge is a picture of a fact specific line of decisions. Circum-
stances dictate which policy considerations should prevail. As the 
cases reveal, the adjudication of administrative claim status exposes 
specific concerns that a rule of law or blind application of fact-specific 
precedent might otherwise conceal. 246 
V. THE MERITS OF ApPLYING SECTION 503(b)(1)(A) 
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS ANALYSIS TO STATE CLEAN-UP ORDERS 
IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 
A. Balancing the Competing Policies 
The resolution of an administrative claim petition involving envi-
ronmental cleanup will depend on the court's interpretation of the 
Code. Implicit in this determination is a balancing of the Code's 
policy, the orderly disbursement of funds, with the policy of cleaning 
up hazardous waste sites.247 
Enforcing environmental clean-up orders can thwart the Code's 
policy in several ways. First, by giving pre-filing clean-up orders 
preferred status, the enforcement interferes with the statutorily 
prescribed scheme of creditor priorities. 248 Normally a state seeking 
to enforce environmental clean-up orders assumes the status of a 
general, unsecured creditor. 249 A state may, however, elevate the 
claim to the status of a statutory lien.250 Without a state statutory 
lien provision, the government as an unsecured creditor will proba-
245 See supra notes 145-59 and accompanying text. Although the Brown Court referred to 
tort claimants, the basic concept is easily extrapolated to include the predicament of creditors 
subordinated by environmental claims. 
246Id. 
247 See generally Note, The Bankruptcy Code and Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Exami-
nation of the Policy Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 165,209-10 (1985). 
248 See infra notes 281-98 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
250 See In re Security Gas & Oil, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 762, 768 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
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bly only receive a percentage of its interest. 251 Although this scheme 
satisfies the priority list of the Code, it restricts the power of states 
and agencies to enforce clean-up orders. 252 Elevating the claim to 
secured status, however, distorts "the Congressionally created prior-
ity scheme and harms other secured creditors. "253 A question re-
mains whether allowing administrative expense priority for clean-
up orders resolves these two extreme positions of a state seeking to 
enforce a clean-up order in bankruptcy proceedings. 254 
A second way in which elevating a clean-up order to preferred 
status interferes with the precepts of the Code is by limiting the 
"breathing space" necessary for a debtor to reorganize. 255 If a com-
pany must liquidate because of a destructive race caused by lack of 
"breathing space," the goals of the Code are frustrated. Liquidation 
under these circumstances would defeat the purpose of the Code in 
allowing a preservation of assets until the trustee can conduct an 
orderly liquidation. 256 Allowing an apparently non-statutory claim 
preferred status may initiate a "destructive race" that destroys the 
going concern value of the business. 257 
Balanced against the policies and provisions of the Code is the 
state's interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens from 
improper storage of hazardous waste. 258 When the state discovers 
improper storage of hazardous waste in the context of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, the court must consider the immediacy, severity, and 
certainty of danger to the public. 259 This is the teaching of Midlantic 
National Bank. 260 When the hazardous waste poses an imminent 
251 See id. at 769; see generally Note, supra note 247. 
252 See Note, supra note 247, at 208-09. 




257 Id.; see also Jackson, Of Liquidation, Continuation, and Delay: An Analysis of Bank-
ruptcy Policy and Nonbankruptcy Rules, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 399, 401-02 (1986). The theory 
behind "going concern value" is that the business as a whole is worth more than its separate 
parts. If the creditors are not involved in a race to maximize individual returns they will act 
collectively to increase the total pool of assets. Absent outside forces, however, the participants 
may be involved in a Prisoner's Dilemma which makes cooperation the irrational option. For 
a description of a Prisoner's Dilemma in the environmental area, Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 861-65 (1982). 
258 S. EpSTEIN, L. BROWN, & C. POPE, HAZARDOUS WASTE IN AMERICA (1984). 
259 See In re Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 762,769 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
1987). 
260 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986). 
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threat to the environment, the trustee cannot abandon the estate. 261 
If the storage of the waste violates state law then its cleanup be-
comes "actual and necessary" and thus allowable as an administrative 
claim under 503(b)(I)(A).262 
In addition to prevention of imminent harm, the enforcement of a 
clean-up order is also consistent with the state's exercise of police 
power.263 When state and federal laws conflict, the federal law con-
trols. 264 States, however, enact laws pursuant to police powers 
granted to them by the Constitution while Congress enacts laws 
pursuant to powers not granted to the states. 265 Facially there is no 
conflict and courts are not willing to imply one. 266 Therefore, the 
enforcement of environmental laws in spite of the Code may not 
raise preemption problems. 267 When conflicts do arise a judicial pro-
ceeding can best resolve them. 268 
Enforcing a clean-up order is also the best way to prevent fraud 
by the estate. 269 Such enforcement will prevent filing for bankruptcy 
to avoid a clean-up order.270 An administrative claim can foreclose 
the possibility of fraud. 271 
A review of the policy considerations indicates that a judicial 
hearing can best resolve any conflicts. The administrative claim can 
261 I d. at 762. 
262 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(I)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
263 U.S. CONST. amend X. 
264 See Note, supra note 247, at 204. 
265Id. 
266Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963» 
("when statutory schemes as a whole do not conflict, a conflict is not to be construed between 
particular provisions because preemption is disfavored unless that conclusion is unmistaka-
ble"). 
267 11 U.S.C. § 725 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In fact Bankruptcy law incorporates some state 
lien provisions. 
268 Far from resolving preemption issues state superlien statutes raise legitimate preemption 
problems. While the Code defers to state law on standards for environmental safety, the vast 
array of possible superlien statutes has the potential of upsetting federally mandated priorites. 
States are in effect engrafting onto the Code as many exceptions as there are states enacting 
such statutes. Such a potpourri of laws interferes with the orderly distribution of the estate. 
The problem is most acute when a national company is bankrupt. If the statute provides, the 
state in which the environmental violation occurs would be able to reach assets outside of the 
state. Knowing this creditors would be more inclined to a destructive race thereby further 
depleting the estate. The near collapse of Texaco invites speculation about the possible 
ramifications of state superlien statutes on creditor priority. 
269 See Note, supra note 247, at 206. 
270 I d. at 205-06. 
271 See id. Any law prioritizing environmental cleanup can prevent fraud by foreclosing the 
option of bankruptcy to avoid cleanup. In this case a "superlien" statute would have a similar 
effect. 
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be used either to enforce a clean-up order or to relegate the order 
to a lesser, yet potentially collectible, status. At least one court has 
articulated an appropriate balancing test. 
The court in In re Security Gas & Oil,Inc. 272 suggested an appro-
priate test to resolve these difficulties. The court suggested balanc-
ing the state's interests against the policies of the Code "in deter-
mining whether to enjoin an environmental clean up order under 
section 105. "273 After holding that the automatic stay provision did 
not protect Security Gas & Oil, the court reviewed the company's 
petition for an affirmative injunction against the environmental 
clean-up order. 274 Under section 105 the Bankruptcy court may issue 
an injunction against any action which would interfere with the 
proper functioning of the Code. 275 Such interference could result from 
enforcing a clean-up order. 
The Security Gas & Oil court suggested certain factors to consider 
when balancing these competing policies. The factors include the 
ability of the debtor to effect a cleanup, the immediacy of the harm, 
and the effect of enforcement on reorganization. 276 These factors can 
be applied when the court determines a petition for administrative 
claim status. 
Whether other courts will look to the equitable factors considered 
by the Security Gas & Oil court remains to be seen. Some courts 
272 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 762 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1986). 
273 See In re Security Gas & Oil, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 762, 769 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
1987). The court listed 9 factors to consider: 
Id. 
1) The immediacy, severity, and certainty of the danger created by the environ-
mental hazard subject to the clean-up order; 
2) The extent to which debtor is uniquely able to effect the cleanup; 
3) The extent to which creditor priorities would be distorted by enforcement of 
the clean-up order; 
4) The effect of the enforcement order on the likelihood of a successful reorgani-
zation, and whether a successful reorganization will substantially increase the payoff 
to creditors and/or preserve jobs; 
5) How long the bankruptcy case has been open; 
6) How long the State delayed in attempting to force debtor to clean up the 
environmental hazard; 
7) The extent to which debtor continues to operate a similar business in the State; 
8) the extent to which orders other than full prohibition of enforcement of clean-
up orders can better accomodate the State health and welfare concerns with the 
policies of the Bankruptcy Code; and 9) Any other consideration relevant to whether 
injunctive relief should be granted, including the good or bad faith of the parties. 
274 See id. 
275 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
276 See Security Gas & Oil, 15 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 769. 
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make policy decisions when electing to enforce a clean-up order. 277 
Some of the factors of Security Gas & Oil will likely playa role in 
that decision. For example, any court reviewing an administrative 
claim petition must look at Midlantic's imminent harm standard. 
Nonetheless, courts make the decision and frequently they rely on 
statutory language not designed to cover the present situation. 278 
When combined with the restrictions of Kovacs, the post-petition 
rule, the benefit/burden rule, and the imminent danger standard, 
the administrative claim provision provides the statutory basis for 
preempting Code priority status. 279 
B. Section 503(bj(1j(A) Provides for Fair Adjudication on the 
Merits 
Ohio v. Kovacs and Midlantic National Bank give courts the 
authority to either enforce an environmental clean-up order by prior-
itizing the claim under section 503(b)(I)(A) of the Code or to subro-
gate the order to the position of a general, unsecured creditor. 280 
Given the financial disposition of a bankrupt estate, the position a 
court takes will determine who bears the burden of the cleanup. 281 
Through a myriad of fact situations the argument usually comes 
down to a a conflict between competing policies: the Code's purpose 
in providing a fresh start and the public health and safety issues 
compelling the cleanup of hazardous waste. 
One commentator has listed the factors that will give rise to an 
administrative priority: 
1) Was the claim post-petition? 
2) Was the claim actual and necessary to rehabilitate the debtor, 
preserve the estate, or liquidate the estate? 
3) Did the expense benefit the estate? 
4) Did the estate incur the expense or did a third party volunteer 
assert the claim ?282 
The issue of toxic waste cleanup subjects these considerations to 
many inconsistent interpretations. As the courts struggle to factor 
the importance of states' clean-up policies into their determination, 
277 See In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 782 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
278 See id. at 780. 
279 Id. 
280 See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755, 
reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986). 
281 For example, in In re Peerless, if the court held for the debtor, the money expended by 
the EPA would not have been reimbursed. 70 Bankr. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1987). 
282 See Note, supra note 38, at 153-54. 
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words like "criminal" and "fairness" appear in the opinions and com-
mentary.283 Whether all polluters are criminal and should be treated 
accordingly appears to contradict the Bankruptcy Code's policy of 
fairness to all creditors.284 Justice Powell stated that whether the 
public will be adequately protected should be the proper measure of 
whether a court should allow an administrative priority.285 This view 
represents a rational deviation from the Code's strict priority list. 
Subjecting a community to 470,000 gallons of carcinogenic and toxic 
substances should not be permitted through lowering the state's 
claim to that of a general unsecured creditor. 286 As a general creditor 
the state would be unable to recoup funds for its cleanup. If the 
state could not clean up the site immediately, the safety systems, 
including sprinkler systems and guard patrols, would be termi-
nated. 287 Without these precautions, the likelihood of a dangerous 
spill would increase dramatically. 288 
By use of the imminent and identifiable danger concept, Powell 
invited varied interpretations. One court has taken the language to 
its extreme. In Maine a court concluded that twenty-nine barrels of 
contaminated oil secured in a tractor trailor posed imminent danger 
to the community.289 Absent explicit evidence of such danger the 
contention seems strained, especially since the barrels were sealed, 
contained, and in a roped-off area designated by warning signs. 
To resolve the competing priorities some states have adopted 
superlien statutes to allow secured liens for hazardous waste 
cleanup.290 These statutes raise issues of fairness and notice to other 
creditors.291 Where superlien provisions exist the state has made a 
rational legislative decision, thus mooting the discussion of admin-
istrative claim priority. 292 
283 See Note, supra note 143, at 397; Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968). 
Z84 See Note, supra note 143, at 437. 
285 Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. NJDEP, 106 S. Ct. 755,762, reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986). 
286 I d. at 758 n.3. 
287 I d. at 758. 
288 Id. 
289 In re Stevens, 68 Bankr. 774, 783 (Bankr. D. Me. 1987). 
290 See, e.g., 58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1O-23.11f(f) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). 
291 Lockett, Caveat Creditor, Environmental Liability Enforcement and the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1978: A study of H.R. 2767, the "Superlien" provision, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. 
J. 859 (1984) (describing how a member of Congress unsuccessfully sought to impose a similar 
lien status on CERCLA claims). 
292 See Jackson, supra note 259, at 405-06. In the process the state may be discouraging 
third party participation with the estate. The spectre of an environmental claim discourages 
third party participation. Rational merchants, even trustees, might hesitate to deal with a 
bankrupt estate knowing that they will receive no payment. 
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As long as parties turn to section 503(b)(1)(A) of the Code, how-
ever, the courts are able to resolve the fairness issue. Some courts 
use a reasoned balance test similar to that which a legislature might 
employ when adopting legislation. 293 Other courts use the applicable 
precedent blindly to resolve the policy considerations. 294 The bottom 
line is that toxic waste cleanup is not prioritized in the Code under 
section 507. As a result, courts are creating an exception based on 
a policy consideration. With continuing judicial resolution, a body of 
law is developing that accepts environmental soundness as a priority, 
but that also supports notions of fairness to creditors. Unless drafted 
to incorporate a balancing of competing interests, superlien statutes 
fail to address a variety of issues which arise in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings.295 The proper use of a balancing test in toxic waste clean-
up cases should resolve the competing interests equitably because 
such a test can balance the competing policies of the Code's "fresh 
start" approach and the states' interest in cleaning up hazardous 
waste. 
By creating superlien statutes, states, to the detriment of the 
Code, are avoiding such a reasoned analysis. Use of the administra-
tive expense priority instead of superlien statutes allows an ad hoc 
ajudication of the issues. Not only is a priority fair to the parties 
involved, but it also preserves, to the extent possible, the priorities 
of the Code. 
Superlien statutes answer the clean-up problem broadly.296 A 
state's legislative effort engrafts a new priority on the federal 
Code. 297 The superlien solution appears to eliminate needless litiga-
tion and expense. The price, of course, is fairness to all creditors. If 
the bankruptcy proceeding is already in court, letting the process 
work to its fruition is a small concession to afford all parties con-
cerned an equitable resolution. Indeed, environmental claims are not 
barred from the process; a survey of the case law indicates their 
success. 298 
A revision of the Code itself would encounter difficulties that 
would render such an effort frustrating. Prioritizing environmental 
293 See supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text. 
294 See supra notes 185-94 and accompanying text. 
295 As a piece of legislation designed to cover all situations, superlien statutes cannot ade-
quately address unique factual circumstances. 
296 See generally MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 1-13; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:1O (Supp. 
1988). 
297 See supra notes 264-69 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 146-59 and accompanying text. 
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claims would involve a struggle at the political level. Even if a 
compromise could be reached the result might be either vague or 
overly specific, inviting litigation to resolve the issues. Once Con-
gress establishes a laundry list, bankruptcy courts may tend to 
pigeonhole claims that have irregular fact patterns or that raise 
unusual points of law. The overall picture of Code revision on this 
point is one of a prolonged struggle to enact legislation and an even 
longer period of judicial interpretation. Absent such an effort to 
determine a new direction for the Code in the toxic waste area, the 
use of the administrative priority can be an effective method to 
liquidate an estate in a manner consistent with the legal rights of all 
the creditors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Comment examines the history of the administrative claim 
in the Bankruptcy Code. What appears is a picture of broadening 
exceptions given priority under section 503(b)(1)(A). Throughout the 
broadening process courts have had difficulty articulating a statutory 
basis for allowing administrative claims, and have ultimately relied 
on policy considerations. Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
area of toxic waste clean-up orders. Although courts look to the 
"actual and necessary" language of the Code, they must go beyond 
its plain meaning to adapt the language to the hazardous waste area. 
The Supreme Court opinion in Midlantic recognizes that the Code 
neglects toxic waste cleanup, but finds a strong policy in favor of 
allowing the claim to protect the environment. Before state legisla-
tures usurp the field by implementing super lien statutes that use 
the Code to prioritize what are deemed to be important claims, 
courts should take steps to broaden the use of the administrative 
priority in toxic waste cleanup. Use of the administrative claim 
allows a fair adjudication on the merits of individual cases. Adjudi-
cation legitimizes an otherwise haphazard approval of toxic waste 
cleanup undertaken by the states. The administrative claim is one 
tool to implement a broader policy consistent with both the Code 
and the states' interest in promoting public health and safety. 
